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Abstract 
I invoke agency theory to evaluate how top 
executives’ compensation contracts are structured, 
conditional on risk in the firm’s operating 
environment, focusing on the total, fixed, and 
variable components. The results suggest that 
companies exert some effort to adhere to agency 
theoretic principles in designing top executive 
compensation contracts. However, imperfections in 
the pay setting process mean that there is ample 
room for powerful CEOs to seek rents. 
Furthermore, when risk in the operating 
environment is measured with volatility in returns, 
non-CEO top executives sometimes bear greater 
risk than CEOs, collecting a greater percentage of 
their compensation in variable pay than most CEOs. 
The results are most distinct in the extreme deciles 
of volatility, suggesting that firms may be paying 
greater attention to compensation design in the most 
extreme settings of volatility. I offer potential 
explanations for this phenomenon. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Top executive compensation continues to be a perplexing 
topic for researchers and regulators alike. This is largely because 
there are so many variables that play a role in determining an 
optimal compensation for top executives, some of them 
measurable, others not. For example, the executive’s level of risk 
aversion is typically unknown and not all the actions she takes are 
observable. Yet her compensation has to be designed to optimally 
share risk in a way that provides her with adequate incentives 
while meeting her reservation wage.   
Early works in the area include (Holmstrom 1979, 
Grossman and Hart 1983, and Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987. 
Relatively more recent works that examine these issues include 
Baker and Hall (2004), Christensen and Feltham (2005). I test 
classic agency theoretic recommendations for efficiently 
structuring managerial compensation by examining the 
performance-pay relation conditional on different proxies in the 
firm’s risk environment. As is typical in the literature, I assume the 
executive is risk averse. I sort a data set of executive-firm-year 
observations into deciles on measures of risk. I use the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations (scaled by average Net 
Operating Assets, NOA) and that of Cumulative Annual Returns as 
my measures of risk (e.g., Core et al. 1999).  
I alternately regress measures of compensation (Total Pay, 
Fixed Pay, and Variable Pay) on performance measures and 
control variables. The performance measures are Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Cumulative Annual Returns when the risk measure is 
the standard deviation (SDV) of cash flows and it is Return on 
Equity (ROE) when the sorting is based on SDV of Cumulative 
Annual Returns. 
I find that while compensation schemes largely adhere to 
the tenets of agency theory, imperfections in the process leaves 
room for rent extraction and other potential distortions like non-
CEOs having more of their pay being variable than do CEOs. 
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Since risk aversion tends to decrease as wealth increases (e.g., 
Becker 2006), one would ordinarily expect CEOs to have larger 
proportion of variable pay than other top executives.  Such 
imperfections may be contributing to the notion of excessive CEO 
compensation both in the popular press and sections of the 
executive compensation research community (e.g., Core et al. 
1999, Bol 2008, Bebchuk and Fried, 2002). 
Conditional on variability in Cumulative Annual Returns, 
CEOs in the Bottom 2 deciles of SDV of Cumulative Annual 
Returns who are also chairs of the board have much larger 
additional compensation even when risk in the environment is 
relatively low.  Though this could be because firms with less 
volatile cash flows tend to be larger, and larger firms may require 
more work of the CEO who is also chairman.  For example, Baker 
and Hall (2004) contends that size tends to drive a significant 
portion of top executives’ pay. Furthermore, Xavier and Landier 
(2008) liken competition for a CEO position as a winner takes all 
tournament where small differences in talent can translate to very 
large difference in compensation, with the most talented people 
managing the largest firms.1  
This paper contributes to the debate on top executive 
compensation by showing that though companies face a 
challenging job of designing optimal compensation contracts given 
all the variables they have to consider, they largely adhere to 
theoretical predictions.  The paper does not explicitly assess 
optimality of association between pay and performance nor 
explicitly evaluate the pay-performance sensitivity2. It tests how 
 
1 Another potential source of the sense of inflated top executive compensation is 
that a significant portion of total compensation has little or no relation to 
performance. These include pensions, severance pay and other perks such as 
housing and transportation.  Some of these tend to be in the “ALL OTHER” pay 
category in ExecuComp. These tend to inflate top executive pay without any 
clear link to performance. 
2 Technically, performance-pay sensitivity is the change in the executive’s 
wealth for a unit change in shareholder wealth. Instead of rates of changes, I 
examine performance-pay relations in levels, with a focus on the components of 
the compensation conditional on risk in the firm’s outputs. 
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pay is structured conditional on a proxy for risk in the operating 
environment and assuming a risk-averse agent. My findings help 
shed some light on potential sources of inefficiency in the top 
executive pay setting process. In particular, components of 
compensation such as pensions, severance packages and other 
perquisites that are not linked to performance and related 
subjectivity in the pay setting process (e.g., Boll 2008) are 
potential sources of inefficiency.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I review the 
pertinent literature and theory in the next section, present the 
research design and data sources in Section 3 and the results in 
Section 4. I discuss the results and conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE AND BACKGROUND 
Agency theory contends that in an ideal world, managers’ 
compensation should be designed in such a way that it creates a 
separating equilibrium, attracting well suited candidates and 
dissuading ill-qualified candidates from applying. This is also 
known as a “first-best result” and in this setting, incentives are not 
very difficult issues (e.g., Bolton and Dawatripont, 2005) but this 
is only an idealized setting against which to judge real world 
contracts (Christensen and Feltham 2005). One way to implement 
a contract that gets close to the idealized result is, the task / job 
description could be designed to include items that well qualified 
candidates can easily do while those ill qualified would struggle to 
complete. In practice, though such perfect job designs are difficult 
to pull off.  The problem is mitigated by credentials such as 
education and experience, augmented by thorough interviews and 
background checks. 
According to agency theory, a major consideration in 
structuring compensation is the level of risk aversion of the agent 
(i.e., manager). Managers are generally assumed to be risk averse 
and principals, risk neutral. The risk neutral assumption for the 
principal (e.g. shareholders) is not unrealistic given the widely held 
beliefs in well-diversified portfolios (e.g., Markowitz 1952).  For 
such a risk averse manager with a risk-neutral principal, the 
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optimal compensation contract is to pay her a fixed salary (e.g., 
Grossman and Hart 1983). However, the level of risk aversion in 
reality varies from manager to manager and shareholders are 
unlikely to be universally risk neutral.  Thus, the principal has to 
provide the manager some incentives by sharing risk with her. But 
the principal faces a tough compensation design problem as the 
more risk averse a manager is the more costly it is to the principal / 
investor to have the manager share some of the risk inherent in the 
firm’s operations since she has to be compensated with a risk 
premium for every additional unit of risk she bears.  For example, 
Lambert et al (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002 and 2003) show 
that it can be very expensive to have executives bear too much risk 
because they tend to assign much lower valuation to risky 
compensation such as stocks and options. In other words, 
executives require higher risk premia the more risk averse they are. 
However, the debate about top executive compensation 
suggests that most top executives obtain the largest portion of their 
compensation from stocks and stock options (e.g. Frydman and 
Jenter 2010). This could be incompatible with the notion of the 
average typical top executive being risk averse as stocks and stock 
options can assign significant risk to the executive to the extent 
that their values can vary widely, sometimes independent of the 
executives’ performance (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and 
can be correspondingly more costly to shareholders. 
To induce an agent to accept a contract, the contract must 
meet the agent’s reservation wage. That is, the compensation 
should be at least as much as her next best alternative (e.g., Laffont 
and Mortimort 2002, Christensen and Feltham 2005). Further, it 
must be incentive compatible. That is, it must induce her to give 
forth her best effort to satisfy her utility function. This suggests 
that the typical top executive contract would have a mix of fixed 
and variable compensation.  
I apply agency theory’s prescription for how a risk-averse 
manager should be compensated to top executives by examining 
their pay performance relation conditional on the risk in the firm‘s 
operating environment and the type of compensation. 
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As risk in the firm’s environment increases, compensation 
should shift more toward fixed and away from variable pay. 
Furthermore, since the higher up a manager is in the organization, 
the “closer” she is to shareholders, and so the more risk she can be 
expected to bear compared to lower level executives, we should 
observe higher level employees (i.e., the CEO) bear more risk in 
her compensation than other executives, all else equal. This view is 
also supported by the fact that risk aversion tends to decrease in 
wealth (e.g., Becker 2006) and CEOs tend to be much wealthier 
than other executives. 
Though the manager’s actions may be unobservable, the 
outputs of those actions often are. Not only are summary reports 
such as the income available to investors, but investors can also 
infer the quality of the effort the manager put forth (e.g. Bolton and 
Dewatripont 2005) from outputs of her actions. The quality of the 
earnings is one way investors can evaluate the quality of the 
manager’s effort. I use the quality of earnings as a proxy for the 
quality of effort that executives exerted and evaluate the role they 
play in the executive’s compensation. 
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
I obtain executive compensation and related data from 
ExecuComp, company financial data from Compustat, and 
company returns data from CRSP. I estimate risk in the operating 
environment with two measures: variability in cash flows deflated 
by average Net Operating Assets (NOA), and variability in returns. 
I sort the data into deciles of the two variability measures. 
These are the Standard Deviation (SDV) of Cash Flow from 
Operations (CFO) scaled by NOA and the Standard Deviation of 
Cumulative Annual Returns (e.g., Core et al. 1999). I estimate the 
following regression for total as well as the primary components of 
top executive compensation, fixed, and variable pay. I scale cash 
flow from operations with Net Operating Assets (NOA) because 
CFO typically derives from operating assets and larger NOA are 
likely to generate larger cash flow from operations. 
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The first estimation of the model is based on a sorting of 
the standard deviation SDV of CFO/Average NOA. I subsequently 
sort the data on SDV of Cumulative Annual Returns. 
 
COMPENSATION = α + β1MEASURE + β2BTM + β3DACC + 
β4LEVERAGE + β5LOSS + β6Z-SCORE + β7DUAL_CEOCHAIR 
+ β8IND + β9YEAR + ε          (1) 
 
Where 
 
COMPENSATION = Alternately, Total Compensation, Fixed Pay, 
and Variable Pay3. 
PERFORM = Is the firm’s performance measure. It is alternately 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Cumulative Annual Returns when the 
data are sorted on Standard Deviation (SDV) of Cash flows (scaled 
by Net Operating Assets), and PERFORM = Return on Equity 
(ROE) when the data are sorted into deciles of Standard Deviation 
(SDV) of Cumulative Annual Return. 
BTM = Ratio of book value to market value of equity 
DACC = The Modified Jones Model Discretionary Accruals 
(Jones 1991, Dechow et al. 1995) 
LOSS = 1 if the firm made a loss that year, 0 otherwise 
Z-score = Zmijewski’s (1984) Z-score. Higher numbers imply 
higher likelihood of financial distress 
DUAL_CEOCHAIR = 1 if the CEO is also the chairman, 0 
otherwise. 
IND = Two digit SIC industry fixed effects 
YEAR = Year fixed effects 
ε = an error term that is ~N(0, σ2) 
 
I present greater details of how Cumulative Annual 
Returns, Net Operating Assets (NOA) and Discretionary Accruals 
 
3 Fixed Pay is primarily composed of salary other non-variable pay.  Variable 
Pay of bonus, stock and stock option awards.  
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(DACC), and the compensation variables are calculated in an 
appendix to the paper. 
I first use Return on Assets (ROA) as the performance 
measure so that the pay-performance relation can be evaluated in 
the context of both debt and equity investors. Next, I use 
Cumulative Annual Returns as the performance measure to 
evaluate the performance-pay relation of top executives from the 
perspective of shareholders. Both measures are evaluated 
conditional on volatility in cash flows (i.e., SDV of CFO/Average 
NOA, the measure of risk in the operating environment). 
Since stock returns are another source of risk in the firm’s 
operating environment. I next evaluate the model based on a 
sorting on the SDV of Cumulative Annual Returns.  The 
performance measure in this case is Return on Equity (ROE). The 
variability measures (SDV of CFO/Average NOA and SDV of 
Cumulative Annual Returns) are estimated from the five prior 
years’ CFO / Average NOA and Cumulative Annual Returns.  
I control for the quality of the executive’s effort with 
Modified Jones Model Discretionary accruals (Jones 1991, 
Dechow et al. 1995). I control for the risk of financial distress with 
Zmijewski’s Z-score and leverage with Debt / Total Assets. Since 
losses are less common because of the protection that bankruptcy 
provides, I control for loss years. CEOs who also chair the board 
tend to have much more power (e.g., Bebchuck and Fried 2002). I 
control for the notion of managerial power with CEO-chair 
Duality. 
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, there has been 
strong public and regulatory outcry against what is perceived as 
excessive executive compensation. For example, this resulted in 
the curbing of top executive compensation at Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) firms (e.g., Shearman and Sterling 2008) 
for several years. It has also resulted in the SEC mandating such 
measures as “Say on Pay” where shareholders get to vote for or 
against top executive compensation proposals (SEC 2011). 
Currently firms are being required to report the multiple of the 
average employee’s pay that the CEO gets (see for example, 
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Murphy 2012 and Eavis 2015). The crises period likely disrupted 
the usual norms of how top executive pay is structured. Therefore, 
I test the theories with data from 1992 to 2006 (the Execucomp 
data base started in 1992). 
I require firms to have sufficient data to estimate the 
variability measures, the Modified Jones Model Discretionary 
Accrual measure, and all other variables used in the models. After 
excluding financial sector and utility companies, the final data set 
has 76,009 executive-firm-year-executive observations spanning 
1992 to 2006. I winsorize the data at the 1.25% and 98.75% levels. 
 
4. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
The average Total Compensation is $1.7 million with a 
standard deviation of $2.5 million, with variable pay being the 
largest component as indicated earlier – about $1 million versus 
$600 thousand for fixed pay (Table 1). With a standard deviation 
of $1.8 million for Total Variable Pay, most of the variability in 
total pay derives from Total Variable Pay compared to $800 
thousand for Total Fixed Pay. There is also a wide range of firm 
sizes.  Average Assets is $3 billion with a standard deviation of 
$6.5 billion. Similarly, the mean market Value if $4 billion, with a 
standard deviation of $9.7 billion. However, note that these 
average compensation and firm size numbers are likely larger for 
more recent years. 
Mean ROA is 5%, Return on Equity (ROE), 7%, and 
Cumulative Annual Return, 17%. The disparity between 
accounting (ROA and ROE) and market returns is at least partly 
explained by the differences in how accounting and the markets 
operate (GAAP’s asymmetrical conservatism versus the different 
levels of market efficiency). These differences provide further 
support for using both as gauges of risk in the firm’s operating 
environment.  
 Differences Between Top and Bottom Two Deciles. 
Except for Total Compensation and CEO-chair Duality which are 
almost equal (p=.06 and .09 respectively) there are striking 
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differences in all variables between the top and bottom two deciles 
(all p-values of differences in means <.01, see Table 2a). As 
expected, the top two deciles have lower Book-to-Market ratios 
(reflecting greater market value growth along with the volatility). 
Though the two groups pay almost the same Total Compensation 
(about $1.74 and $1.8 for the top and bottom two deciles 
respectively), the top deciles of volatility pay a greater proportion 
in variable pay (about  73% versus  56%) likely reflecting the 
larger market values; Book-to-Market is much lower for the top 
two deciles, and growing firms tend to pay greater proportion in 
equity in part to align executive and shareholder interests and 
sometimes to attract top talent in spite of cash constraints. 
Furthermore, their relatively higher market values can help reduce 
the risk premium (e.g., Hall and Murphy 2002 and 2003) 
associated with stock-based compensation. Less risky firms 
(bottom two deciles) are larger both by Total Assets and Market 
value.  
 
Differences Between CEOs and Non-CEOs. Table 2b 
shows the differences in means and medians for CEOs and non-
CEO top executives.  While all the compensation and position 
related variables are significantly different between the two 
groups, there is no significant difference between the two groups in 
almost all the company-level variables.  
The correlations among the primary variables are in Table 
3. Unsurprisingly the correlation amongst the compensation 
variables are high. While most other correlations are significant at 
the .05 level, they tend to be small.  
 
Multivariate Results 
I first present the results of the pay-performance measure 
relations across all sorting of volatility measures before turning to 
presenting the results of the control variables, especially since the 
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control variables behave similarly across all the different sorting of 
the risk measures4. 
Sorting on SDV (CFO / NOA) with ROA as 
Performance Measure. The results of estimating Equation 1 
based on a sorting of the standard deviation (SDV) of Cash Flow 
from Operations / Average Net Operating Assets SDV (CFO / Avg 
NOA) are in Table 4.  The first three columns reflect Total Pay as 
the dependent variable for the Bottom 2, Middle 6, and Top 2 
deciles of SDV (CFO/NOA) respectively. The next three columns 
reflect the Fixed Pay component of Total Pay, and the last three, 
the Variable Pay component.  
The insights from the univariate analysis are partly borne 
out here. For Total Pay, there is a monotonic decline in the pay-
performance relation as measured by ROA as volatility increases 
(for all executives), though the incremental decline for executives 
who are CEOs as volatility increases is not monotonic (see Figure 
1a). The decline in the pay-performance relation as volatility 
increases comes from both fixed and variable pay for all top 
executives (The ROA variable declines across the board in Table 
4; also see Figures 1b and 1c). 
Being the CEO increases an executive’s Total Pay 
significantly. Interestingly, when risk in the environment is low 
(the Bottom 2 deciles), most of the incremental CEO pay is 
variable while for more risky firm environments (Middle 6 and 
Top 2 deciles), incremental pay for being CEO come in the form of 
Fixed Pay (see the Executive is CEO variable in Table 4).  
The diagrammatic presentation of incremental CEO 
compensation for fixed and variable is more interesting. Most 
CEOs (Middle 6 deciles) get most of their incremental 
compensation in Fixed Pay – incremental variable pay is 40% for 
this group (see Figure 1b, c, and d.) Also, there is a strong relation 
between ROA and Fixed Pay for this group while the relation 
between ROA and Variable Pay is insignificant. 
 
4 All models are estimated with White-corrected robust standard errors, 
significantly mitigating concerns about heteroskedasticity (e.g., Greene 2003). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100 
Asare: Top Executive Pay and Variability in Firm Operational Risk 380 
Figures 1b, c, and d suggest that variable pay is a large 
component of incremental pay for executives who are CEOs in the 
Bottom 2 and Top 2 deciles of cash flow volatility (though only the 
Bottom 2 is significant in Table 4). The incremental pay 
percentages for the Bottom 2 and Top 2 deciles of volatility are 
80% and about 83% respectively composed of variable pay.  
Basing a large component of a CEO’s compensation on 
variable pay when risk in the operating environment is low is 
consistent with agency theory (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). 
Basing more than 80% of a CEO’s incremental pay on variable pay 
when risk in the environment is high can also be consistent with 
self-selection where less risk averse CEOs seek out firms that pay 
more in variable pay. Another contributing factor is that firms in 
the top two deciles of volatility are growth firms (low book-to-
market), smaller, and riskier (higher Z-scores). Therefore, they are 
more likely to face cash constraints that can compel them to offer 
more stock-based compensation. 
Sorting on SDV (CFO / NOA) with Cumulative Annual 
Returns as Performance Measure. Table 5 shows the results of 
estimating the model with Cumulative Annual Return as the 
performance measure conditional on risk in cash flows. With 
market returns as the performance measure, it appears that most 
executives are protected from market reaction to performance. This 
is evidenced in the negative or insignificant coefficient on 
Cumulative Annual Return. 
This result suggests that firms attempt to meet executives’ 
reservation wages and utilities in spite of market reaction to the 
actions they take. This is consistent with an agency theoretic 
setting where the principal attempts to balance incentives with risk 
sharing, knowing that the agent taking a good action can still result 
in a bad outcome. While Holmstrom’s informativeness principle 
argues that all information that can provide insight on the 
manager’s actions should be used in evaluating the manager, by 
the same token, information that does not inform on the manager’s 
actions or effort should be excluded as such information only add 
noise (Holmstrom 1979, Holmstrom and Milgraom 1987). Thus, 
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conditional on volatility in cash flows, it is possible that returns are 
a noisy measure that firms may ignore in the compensation setting 
process. As a practical example, an executive can make 
investments that can cause volatility in current or near-term cash 
flow but not affect returns till several years hence. 
Even for executives who are CEOs the incremental pay for 
the Middle 6 and Top 2 deciles of volatility come from fixed pay. 
It is only for the Bottom 2 deciles of volatility that the incremental 
pay for CEOs come from Variable Pay, consistent with treating 
CEOs as largely risk averse. 
Sorting on SDV of Cumulative Annual Returns with 
ROE as Performance Measure (results in Table 6). Having 
ROE as the performance measure implies that top executives are 
being evaluated on their performance for shareholders, not 
necessarily for all capital providers. The pay-performance relation 
for top executives declines monotonically from the Bottom 2 to the 
Top 2 deciles for Total Pay, Fixed Pay, and Variable Pay for all 
executives (See the Return on Equity variable in Table 6). This 
result again is consistent with agency theory in that the principal 
partially shields the agent from variability in compensation as risk 
in the firm’s environment increases.   
However, for CEOs, the incremental pay-performance 
relation is increased conditional on the risk in the market returns. 
While in terms of Total Pay, the increase in the performance-pay 
relation appears monotonic (see Executive is CEO in first three 
columns of Table 6), there are important differences in how the 
increase is distributed conditional on risk in market returns. For the 
Bottom 2 deciles, almost all the incremental pay from being a CEO 
comes from Fixed Pay, suggesting that this may be the most risk-
averse CEOS. For the Middle 6 deciles, about 34% of the 
incremental pay for being CEO comes from Fixed Pay. Though 
only about 29% of the incremental pay for being CEO comes from 
fixed pay for the Top 2 deciles of SDV of returns, both the fixed 
and variable components are almost insignificant (p<.10), 
suggesting that performance-pay relation for CEOs is weakened as 
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risk increases. Again, these results are consistent with agency 
theory assuming a risk averse CEO. 
Interestingly, except for the Middle 6 deciles, top 
executives in general get a larger portion of their total pay in 
variable form than do CEOs. For top executives in general, it is 
about 60%, 59.4% and 60% for the Bottom 2, Middle 6 and Top 2 
deciles respectively. The corresponding ratios for CEOs on the 
other had are 32%, 64% are 53% respectively. Again, this may 
reflect differences in bargaining power between CEOs and other 
top executives, self-selection of highly risk averse CEOs into low 
risk firm environments, and less risk averse CEOs into 
environments that offer relatively more risk and potential reward 
or more likely, a combination of the two.  
These patterns are presented diagrammatically in figures 2a 
– 2d. Besides the possibility of non-CEOs having lower bargaining 
power in their compensation setting processes, it is also possible 
that non-CEO top executives tend to have lower levels of risk 
aversion and are willing to challenge themselves more in their 
quest to reach the corner office. This ambition may compel some 
of them to take more variable pay to motivate themselves and to 
show that they “have what it takes” to be CEO. 
Control Variables. Across all models, Book-to-Market is 
negatively related to compensation, reflecting the fact that high 
market value firms tend to pay their top executives more, though 
the amount generally decreases as risk increases. I control for the 
quality of the executive’s output with the Modified Jones Model 
Discretionary Accruals (Jones 1991 and Dechow et al. 1995). 
Negative discretionary accruals are income decreasing and positive 
ones are income increasing. The significant coefficients suggests 
that boards of directors tend to incorporate the quality of income 
into compensation decisions, though the small coefficients suggest 
their effects on compensation are not very large. The negative sign 
on the coefficients imply that income decreasing discretionary 
accruals are likely interpreted as higher quality income and 
rewarded and vice-versa. Executives are able to increase their total 
compensation by levering up their capital structure. They reap the 
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benefits of leverage primarily through Fixed Pay. Losses are 
generally negatively associated with compensation, but the effects 
are quite small for CEOs.  
Interestingly, financial distress (measured by Zmijewski’s 
Z-score (Zmijewski 1984) is incrementally positively related to 
Variable Pay for the Middle 6 and Top 2 deciles of risk. This could 
be related to valuable equity and options-based offers made to 
attract executives to distressed companies or induce them to stay.  
The only systematic pattern between CEO-Chair Duality 
and compensation emerges when risk is measured in terms of 
market returns (Table 6). In the Bottom 2 and Middle 6 deciles of 
risk, CEOs who are also chairs of the board command significantly 
higher premia for being chairs and the incremental pay decreases 
in risk. This suggests some level of self-selection with the most 
risk averse CEOs going to firms with lower risk in market returns 
or CEOs using their positions as chairs of the board to extract rents 
from shareholders. It is also possible that CEOs who are also chairs 
of the board are just being paid to do more work as the firms with 
less risk also tend to be larger (e.g., Baker and Hall 2004).  
 
Sensitivity Tests with Current and Non-Current Pay 
In sensitivity tests in which the dependent variable is 
alternately Current Pay (salary and bonus, i.e., cash pay) and Non-
Current Pay (largely deferred stocks and options), the tenor of the 
general results holds with the following exceptions. Executives’ 
Current Pay is positively related to Cumulative Annual Returns in 
a monotonically decreasing fashion as cash flow risk increases. 
However, they are protected from market effects on their stock- 
and option-related pay as the relation between Cumulative Annual 
Returns and Non-current Pay is negative, with the largest 
“protection” (i.e., largest negative coefficient) on the Bottom 2 
declines of cash flow risk (see Table 7).  
A diagrammatic presentation of the coefficients on 
Cumulative Annual Return for All Executives and for Executive is 
CEO for both Current Pay and Non-current Pay is presented in 
Figure 3a and 3b. This result is also consistent with the principal 
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shifting compensation from the relatively more variable stocks and 
options to the more stable salary and bonus as risk in the operating 
environment increases. The larger Current Pay coefficients as 
volatility in cash flows decline reinforces the possibility of some 
extent of self-selection of top executives into firms depending on 
their level of risk aversion. Since the results of the other sorting of 
the data are very similar to those presented previously, I do not 
present them. 
 
Sensitivity Tests with the Middle 6 Deciles 
It is possible that firms systematically set compensation 
contracts for most top executives conditional on the volatility in 
the outputs of the firm’s operating environment. If so, examining 
the “hold out” sample of the middle six deciles will exhibit a 
systematic pattern of results consistent with agency theory such as 
declining relation between pay and performance as volatility 
increases. On the other hand if only firms in situations of extreme 
volatility devote significant effort to structuring the components of 
pay (e.g., more fixed or current pay relative to variable or non-
current pay in high volatility settings) then there will be no 
systematic pattern observed when the Middle 6 deciles are 
examined in greater detail. 
 To test this, I re-estimate the models but for only the 
Middle 6 deciles of volatility. The only result that displays a 
systematic pattern that can be interpreted as a consistent with 
agency theory is the regression of Current Pay on ROA and control 
variables, conditional on volatility in cash flows (i.e., sorted on 
SDV (CFO/Avg NOA)). This suggests that firms likely exert more 
effort in designing compensation contracts in extreme settings of 
volatility compared to moderate volatility settings.  The results of 
examining the Middle 6 deciles in greater detail suggests that in 
non-extreme volatility situations (i.e., moderate volatility) firms 
focus on linking the Current Pay component of compensation with 
a broad accounting measure like ROA and de-emphasize other 
measures. There is an almost monotonic decline in the relation 
between Current Pay and ROA as volatility in cash flows increases 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
Volume 20, No. 3 (2019) 
385 
(see Table 8). Since current pay is composed of only salary and 
bonus, it appears that companies do not systematically calibrate 
volatility in cash flows and stock prices into their stocks and 
options-based compensation contracts in moderate volatility 
settings.  
 In turn, the relative exclusion of stock and stock-related 
compensation in non-extreme volatility settings may be 
contributing to the notion of managerial power and rent extraction 
in both academic scholarship on top executive compensation and 
in the popular press (e.g., Bebchuk 2009, Bebchuk and Fried 2002, 
and Desai 2012). 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper tests agency theory’s efforts to explain how 
managerial compensation should be set conditional on the risk in 
the operating environment and assuming the manager is risk 
averse.  It is a difficult problem since managerial actions are not 
fully observable and so she has to be incentivized to take the 
desired actions. The need to provide the manager with incentives 
often means providing her with variable pay which is less desirable 
the more risk averse the manger is (e.g., Hall and Murphy 2002). 
The results of the paper suggest that companies attempt to strike 
this balance and while they largely succeed in striking a good 
balance between providing incentives and meeting the manager’s 
reservation wage and utility, imperfections in the contracting 
process (for example, unobservable managerial actions) and 
differences in bargaining power can allow some CEOs to collect 
rents (e.g., Bebchuck and Fried 2002 and Morse et al. 2011).  
 This could be what is reflected in the significantly large 
incremental compensation for being chair of the board in a firm 
with low risk even as some non-CEO executives share more risk 
than may be commensurate with their level of risk aversion. For 
example, when volatility in stock returns is the measure of risk in 
the operating environment non-CEO top executives tend to have a 
greater share of their income in variable pay than CEOs (see 
Figure 2d, which is derived from Table 6) 
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Another potential contributor to the notion of inefficient top 
executive compensation is that in moderate volatility settings, 
companies seem to not deliberately structure the components of 
compensation to reflect operating risk as they do in extreme 
volatility settings. 
Further research that examines the pay setting process of 
non-CEO top executives and what motivates them can be fruitful. 
For example, is it possible non-CEO top executives assume more 
challenge / risk as a way to demonstrate their suitability for the top 
job?  Also, research that investigates if and how firms deliberately 
consider and / or incorporate volatility in the operating 
environment into compensation design can be very informative. To 
this end Graham et al.  (2012) present interesting research in the 
context of CEOs (as opposed to all top executives) that points to 
individual CEO “fixed effects” playing a much larger role in 
determining compensation. However, Fee et al. (2013) contend 
that most of Graham et al.’s results can be explained by exogenous 
CEO changes. That is, when top-performing CEOs voluntarily 
leave the firm, the firm tends to continue with the existing strategy 
leaving CEO “fixed effects” to account for a much smaller 
component of CEO compensation. 
Research that examines the extent, if any, that significant 
components of compensation like pensions and severance 
packages that are seemingly unlinked to performance are 
negotiated can also enhance researchers and regulators’ 
understanding of the top executive pay setting process. 
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Appendix 
1. Estimation of Cumulative Annual Return (CAR) 
RET = (SPEND / SPBEG) – 1 
Where  
RET = Monthly returns 
SPEND = Stock price at the end of the month 
SPBEG = Stock price at the beginning of the month 
CAR = EXP (ln∑(1 + RET)) – 1, where the summation is over the 
12 months spanning each firm’s fiscal year. 
Standard deviations are measured using the prior five years’ CARs. 
 
2. Calculation of Net Operating Assets (NOA) 
Total Operating Assets = Total Assets – Cash – Marketable 
Securities – Cash Equivalents 
Total Operating Liabilities = Total Liabilities – Long Term Debt – 
Short Term Debt 
Net Operating Assets (NOA) = Total Operating Assets – Total 
Operating Liabilities 
Standard deviations are calculated using the prior five years’ (CFO 
/ Average NOA). 
Average NOA = (NOAEND + NOABEG) / 2 
Where 
NOABEG = Beginning NOA 
NOAEND = Ending NOA 
 
 
3. Estimation of Discretionary Accruals (DISC-ACCRUAL) 
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the Modified Jones 
Model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). 
TACCt = α + β1(ΔREVt – ΔRECt) + β2PPEt + εt   
   
Where  
TACC = Total Accrual, measured as Net Income – Cash Flow 
from Operations 
ΔREV = Change in Revenue from the prior year 
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ΔREC = Change in Accounts Receivables from the prior year 
PPE = Property, Plant and Equipment 
ε = Error term (residuals) representing the measure of discretionary 
accruals. 
The model is estimated at the 2-digit SIC code level and I require 
there to be at least nine observations per SIC code to enter the 
sample. 
 
4. Background on Compensation Variables 
Total Compensation (called TDC1 in Execucomp) = Salary + 
Bonus + Other Annual Compensation + Restricted Stock Grants + 
Long Term Incentive Payment Payouts + All Other + Value of 
Option Grants. 
Non-current Pay = Black Scholes value of stock option awards + 
stock awards 
Current Pay = Salary + Bonus 
Variable Pay = Non-current Pay + stock option awards 
Other Fixed Pay = Total Compensation – Variable Pay – Salary 
Total Fixed Pay = Salary + Other Fixed Pay 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100 
Asare: Top Executive Pay and Variability in Firm Operational Risk 392 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Primary Variables 
 Mean 1st 
Quartile 
Median 3rd 
Quartile 
Std. Dev. 
Total Compensation (Thousands) $1675.82 $444.93 $849.11 $1784.24 $2465.48 
Return on Assets  0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.13 
Return on Equity 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.34 
Cumulative Annual Return 0.17 -0.15 0.10 0.38 0.54 
Book-to-Market 0.49 0.25 0.41 0.62 0.39 
Discretionary Accruals (Millions) $-120.70 $-104.78 $-14.50 $21.93 $452.63 
Zmijewski's Z-score 5.29 2.44 3.79 5.96 5.55 
Total Fixed Pay (Thousands) $615.64 $233.31 $358.60 $634.40 $811.64 
Total Variable Pay (Thousands) $1017.65 $144.60 $402.03 $1035.55 $1826.31 
Total Current Pay (Thousands) $606.57 $275.00 $431.25 $721.59 $545.29 
Total Non-current Pay (Thousands) $742.08 $0.00 $201.17 $697.82 $1543.56 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 0.26 0.09 0.25 0.39 0.20 
Average Assets (Millions) $3,013.01 $328.13 $817.83 $2,383.14 $6,546.61 
Market Value $4,028.96 $381.41 $951.36 $2,960.86 $9,654.44 
Loss Year 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
CEO-chair Duality 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 
Std Dev of CFO / Avg NOA 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.31 
Std Dev. of Cumulative Annual Returns 0.48 0.20 0.35 0.59 0.46 
N 76,009     
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Table 2a: Mean and Median Differences of Top and Bottom Deciles 
 Mean 
(Top 2 
Deciles) 
Mean 
(Bottom 2 
Deciles) 
p-value Median 
(Top 2 
Deciles) 
Median 
(Bottom 2 
Deciles) 
p-value 
Total Compensation (Thousands) $1,737.00 $1,798.01 0.06 $811.28 $948.47 0.00 
Return on Assets (Millions) 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 
Return on Equity 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.49 
Cumulative Annual Return 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.00 
Book-to-Market 0.38 0.53 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 
Discretionary Accruals (Millions)) $-64.89 $-190.36 0.00 $-5.87 $-30.36 0.00 
Zmijewski's Z-score 7.16 4.00 0.00 4.81 3.19 0.00 
Total Fixed Pay (Thousands) $465.38 $769.93 0.00 $288.64 $444.04 0.00 
Total Variable Pay (Thousands) $1,210.15 $983.59 0.00 $433.95 $415.89 0.03 
Total Current Pay (Thousands) $506.93 $701.77 0.00 $365.47 $515.11 0.00 
Total Non-current Pay (Thousands) $969.36 $666.34 0.00 $263.82 $187.60 0.00 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 0.19 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.33 0.00 
Average Assets (Millions) $1,333.38 4743.26 0.00 $399.37 $1,534.30 0.00 
Market Value (Millions) $2,763.31 $5567.15 0.00 $690.47 $1,517.06 0.00 
Loss Year 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO-chair Duality 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 
Std. Dev of CFO / Avg. NOA 0.44 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 
Std. Dev. of Cumulative Annual Returns 0.70 0.33 0.00 0.51 0.25 0.00 
n 13,013 13,361  13,013 13,361  
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Table 2b: Mean and Median Differences of CEO and Non-CEO Executives 
 Mean 
(CEOs) 
Mean 
(Non-
CEOs) 
p-value Median 
(CEOs) 
Median 
(Non-
CEOs) 
p-value 
Total Compensation (Thousands) $3,406.14 $1,306.32 0.00 $1,954.87 $730.08 0.00 
Return on Assets 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.13 
Return on Equity 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.06 
Cumulative Annual Return 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.30 
Book-to-Market 0.49 0.49 0.92 0.41 0.41 0.94 
Discretionary Accruals (Millions) $-126.70 $-119.42 0.09 $-15.99 $-14.19 0.02 
Zmijewski's Z-score 5.30 5.29 0.93 3.77 3.79 0.48 
Total Fixed Pay (Thousands) $1,129.02 $506.02 0.00 $687.00 $318.15 0.00 
Total Variable Pay (Thousands) $2,141.94 $777.56 0.00 $1049.75 $340.09 0.00 
Total Current Pay (Thousands) $1,106.63 $499.79 0.00 $855.21 $383.52 0.00 
Total Non-current Pay (Thousands) $1,553.74 $568.76 0.00 $574.03 $172.38 0.00 
Leverage (Debt / Total Assets) 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.18 
Average Assets (Millions) $3,137.48 $2,986.43 0.02 $865.85 $808.58 0.00 
Market Value (Millions) $4,253.88 $3,980.92 0.00 $1,033.95 $934.00 0.00 
Loss Year 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 
CEO-chair Duality 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev of CFO / Avg. NOA 0.09 0.10 0.48 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Std. Dev. of Cumulative Annual Returns 0.47 0.48 0.06 0.34 0.35 0.12 
N 13,375 62,634  13,375 62,634  
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Table 3, Firm Performance and Top Executives' Pay: Correlation of Primary Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Total Compensensationn, 1 1
Return on Assets, 2 0.08** 1
Return on Equityy, 3 0.07** 0.62** 1
Cum. Annual Return, 4 0.01** 0.16** 0.11** 1
Book-to-Market, 5 -0.15** -0.20** -0.15** -0.23** 1
Discretionary Accruals, 6 -0.33**  0.10**  0.06** 0.03** .08** 1
Zmijewski's Z-score, 7 0.06** 0.36** 0.17** 0.19** -0.29** 0.08** 1
Total Fixed Pay, 8 0.66** 0.05** 0.07** 0 -0.08** -0.31** -0.10** 1
Total Variable Pay,9 0.93** 0.08** 0.06** 0.01** -0.16** -0.27** 0.12** 0.38** 1
Total Current Pay, 10 0.66** 0.14** 0.14** 0.03** -0.14** -0.32** -0.05** 0.61** 0.57** 1
Total Non-current Pay, 11 0.87** 0.05** 0.04** 0 -0.15** -0.24** 0.13** 0.30** 0.97** 0.41** 1
Leverage (Deb /  Assets), 12 0.02** -0.20**  -0.09**.07** .04** -0.12** -0.53** 0.14** -0.03** 0.12** -0.05** 1
Average Assets, 13 0.38** 0.03** 0.07** -0.03**  -0.07** -0.74**-0.11** 0.42** 0.300**0.44** 0.24**  0.19** 1
Market Value, 14 0.44** 0.15** 0.14** 0.02** -0.21** -0.60** 0.10** 0.36** 0.40** 0.43** 0.35** 0.01 0.79** 1
Loss Year, 15 -0.06**  -0.68**-0.51** -0.13** 0.21** -0.09** -0.18** -0.07** -0.05** -0.15** -0.01** 0.11** -0.06** -0.12** 1
CEO-chair Duality, 16 0.32** 0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0 -0.01 0 0.29** 0.28** 0.42** 0.24** 0 0.01* 0.01** -0.01 1
SDV of CFO / NOA, 17 0.03** -0.10**  -0.06**0.01** -0.09** 0.03** 0.08** -0.04** 0.05** -0.03**  0.06** -0.08** -0.06** -0.01** 0.08** 0 1
SDV. of Cum. Annual Ret, 180.02** -0.05** -0.06** -0.01 0.06** 0.06** 0.14** 0.14** -0.10** 0.06** -0.10**  0.08** -0.14** -0.09** 0.10** -0.01 0.15** 1
p -values in parentheses. 
*
 p  < 0.10, 
**
 p  < 0.05, 
***
 p  < 0.01.
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Table 4: Relation Between Firm ROA and Executives' Total, Fixed, and Variable Pay Respectively SDV 
of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort) 
Dependent Variable: Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Deciles of Volatility: Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 
Intercept 522.851 478.052** 260.330 248.801 346.115*** 237.908*** 335.791 175.152 36.482 
 (0.118) (0.034) (0.528) (0.211) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.237) (0.915) 
Return on Assets 3395.569** 1991.597*** 956.660*** 1422.725*** 730.572*** 249.565*** 1893.645* 1203.586*** 685.352*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.008) 
Executive is CEO 1997.032** 1501.419*** 1588.269* 324.572 645.948*** 204.828*** 1652.912** 577.083 1376.988 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.094) (0.303) (0.008) (0.002) (0.019) (0.123) (0.147) 
Book-to-Market -713.783*** -624.163*** -526.177*** -151.687*** -117.255*** -53.567** -540.714*** -499.526*** -436.535*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discretionary Accruals -1.570*** -1.682*** -1.994*** -0.585*** -0.512*** -0.272*** -0.889*** -1.057*** -1.470*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 661.097* 351.335** 637.547** 203.867* 260.964*** 220.745*** 412.612 52.407 398.296* 
 (0.067) (0.044) (0.017) (0.093) (0.000) (0.001) (0.157) (0.690) (0.090) 
Loss Year 44.992 -26.567 -173.987 0.015 -40.688** -15.164 45.639 10.430 -128.316 
 (0.765) (0.675) (0.118) (1.000) (0.049) (0.580) (0.701) (0.829) (0.172) 
Zmijewski's Z-score -25.493 9.731 28.550*** -22.439*** -15.218*** -4.672*** -4.487 20.402** 29.455*** 
 (0.173) (0.401) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.776) (0.039) (0.001) 
CEO-chair Duality 342.147 520.604 294.881 470.507 -43.142 233.532*** -242.385 747.392** -78.149 
 (0.670) (0.334) (0.757) (0.135) (0.860) (0.001) (0.731) (0.047) (0.935) 
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13361 49635 13013 13361 49635 13013 13361 49635 13013 
Adj R-squared 0.356 0.273 0.232 0.339 0.245 0.195 0.269 0.229 0.215 
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust standard errors.  
Table 5: Relation Between Firm Returns and Executives' Total, Fixed, and Variable Pay Respectively (SDV 
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of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort) 
Dependent Variable: Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Deciles of Volatility: Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 
Intercept 887.603** 523.942** 257.162 382.853* 362.644*** 234.581*** 555.948*** 205.541 36.029 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.490) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.143) (0.907) 
Cumulative Annual Return -213.142** -15.905 -59.227 20.971 -4.777 17.258 -217.183*** -18.819 -66.194 
 (0.012) (0.628) (0.288) (0.464) (0.561) (0.154) (0.001) (0.485) (0.169) 
Executive is CEO 1955.255** 1358.819*** 1636.063* 317.641 593.837** 224.520*** 1620.187** 489.171 1405.980 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.078) (0.317) (0.017) (0.001) (0.025) (0.160) (0.133) 
Book-to-Market -846.125*** -660.169*** -521.392*** -181.222*** -130.206*** -41.502* -637.624*** -523.529*** -440.967*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discretionary Accruals -1.551*** -1.661*** -1.973*** -0.581*** -0.505*** -0.269*** -0.875*** -1.044*** -1.454*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 568.051 331.560* 647.062** 161.977 253.689*** 223.881*** 363.312 40.638 404.638* 
 (0.118) (0.059) (0.016) (0.181) (0.000) (0.001) (0.210) (0.759) (0.084) 
Loss Year -341.339*** -338.256*** -484.424*** -151.412*** -154.930*** -94.162*** -179.122** -178.752*** -352.157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
Zmijewski's Z-score -2.468 22.274** 33.968*** -13.527*** -10.629*** -3.741** 9.008 28.085*** 33.687*** 
 (0.887) (0.045) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.542) (0.003) (0.000) 
CEO-chair Duality 383.974 664.509 245.276 477.744 9.458 213.858*** -209.887 835.997** -108.793 
 (0.646) (0.201) (0.793) (0.132) (0.970) (0.002) (0.772) (0.017) (0.908) 
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13361 49635 13013 13361 49635 13013 13361 49635 13013 
Adj R-squared 0.352 0.270 0.230 0.334 0.242 0.193 0.268 0.226 0.214 
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust standard errors. Table 6: 
Relation Between Firm ROE and Executives' Total, Fixed, and Variable Pay Respectively (SDV of 
Returns Sort) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100 
Asare: Top Executive Pay and Variability in Firm Operational Risk 398 
Dependent Variable: Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Deciles of Volatility: Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 
Intercept 1034.132*** 288.704 645.608*** 396.246*** 318.105*** 278.471*** 637.992*** 31.066 367.388** 
 (0.000) (0.269) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.848) (0.020) 
Return on Equity 441.947*** 391.502*** 297.185** 148.821*** 134.698*** 95.417*** 266.010** 232.806*** 177.626* 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.020) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.015) (0.000) (0.076) 
Executive is CEO 390.373** 892.708*** 3380.216*** 304.034** 306.336*** 951.558* 75.258 590.033** 1768.357* 
 (0.035) (0.006) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) (0.084) (0.763) (0.045) (0.072) 
Book-to-Market -825.908*** -584.789*** -653.428*** -175.886*** -119.555*** -51.653* -642.925*** -458.382*** -559.911*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discretionary Accruals -1.377*** -1.703*** -2.039*** -0.469*** -0.564*** -0.345*** -0.839*** -1.008*** -1.511*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 44.928 439.377** 693.650*** 21.478 257.297*** 303.832*** 13.650 151.020 341.605 
 (0.872) (0.010) (0.005) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000) (0.951) (0.243) (0.108) 
Loss Year -196.398** -299.697*** -112.318 -115.200*** -116.130*** -43.067 -73.143 -171.634*** -90.643 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.274) (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.295) (0.000) (0.278) 
Zmijewski's Z-score -10.480 17.788* 35.735*** -18.071*** -11.408*** -3.974*** 5.726 25.612*** 33.972*** 
 (0.427) (0.056) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.585) (0.001) (0.000) 
CEO-chair Duality 1742.715*** 1142.192*** -1330.743 400.541*** 323.353*** -491.288 1236.849*** 720.193** -330.069 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.003) (0.001) (0.370) (0.000) (0.015) (0.738) 
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14334 45713 15962 14334 45713 15962 14334 45713 15962 
Adj R-squared 0.322 0.282 0.244 0.288 0.270 0.180 0.261 0.222 0.233 
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust 
standard errors, mitigating concerns about heteroskedasticity. 
Table 7: Relation Between Firm Returns and Executives' Current Non-current Pay Respectively (SDV 
of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100 
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Dependent Variable: Current Pay Non-current Pay 
Deciles of Volatility: Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 Bottom 2 Middle 6 Top 2 
Intercept 790.049*** 501.293*** 299.196*** 112.632 31.966 -35.025 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.524) (0.786) (0.894) 
Cumulative Annual Return 42.484** 27.083*** 21.174** -256.719*** -56.020** -78.144* 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.018) (0.080) 
Executive is CEO 597.642 396.674*** 251.928* 1093.166 419.689 1366.978 
 (0.161) (0.000) (0.067) (0.137) (0.213) (0.152) 
Book-to-Market -191.289*** -154.053*** -64.364*** -477.816*** -405.526*** -373.287*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discretionary Accruals -0.357*** -0.366*** -0.286*** -0.625*** -0.768*** -1.164*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 139.152 153.506*** 188.655*** 321.140 -33.270 280.966 
 (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.763) (0.188) 
Loss Year -177.972*** -202.844*** -196.139*** -56.662 -27.576 -203.915** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.374) (0.351) (0.010) 
Zmijewski's Z-score -9.486*** -7.090*** -0.824 13.922 29.031*** 30.712*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.671) (0.262) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-chair Duality 104.640 210.123** 197.379 -112.241 531.512 -376.360 
 (0.805) (0.018) (0.149) (0.879) (0.116) (0.694) 
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13361 49635 13013 13361 49635 13013 
Adj R-squared 0.452 0.388 0.310 0.210 0.188 0.198 
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust standard errors, mitigating 
concerns about heteroskedasticity. 
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Figures 1a – 1d are based on the coefficients of the regression results in Table 4. The coefficients on 
ROA correspond to All Executives in the diagram and the coefficients on Executive is CEO are the 
incremental compensation for executives who are CEOs. The intercepts are not included in the 
diagrams.
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Figures 2a – 2d are based on the coefficients of the regression results in Table 6. The coefficients on 
ROA correspond to All Executives in the diagram and the coefficients on Executive is CEO are the 
incremental compensation for executives who are CEOs. The intercepts are not included in the 
diagrams.
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Figures 3a and 3b are based on the coefficients of the regression results in Table 7. The coefficients on 
ROA correspond to All Executives in the diagrams and the coefficients on Executive is CEO are the 
incremental compensation for executives who are CEOs. The intercepts are not included in the 
diagrams. 
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Table 8: Breakup of Middle 6 Deciles: Relation Between Firm ROA and Executives' Current Pay (SDV 
of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort) 
 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 
Intercept 331.229*** 532.946*** 522.059*** 443.911*** 571.757*** 368.674** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
Return on Assets 1136.048*** 1248.811*** 956.757*** 877.061*** 807.300*** 794.880*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Executive is CEO 461.705*** 383.291*** 823.048*** 49.107 348.098*** 518.924*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.372) (0.001) (0.007) 
Book-to-Market -166.964*** -146.977*** -179.149*** -152.908*** -106.011*** -124.552*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discretionary Accruals -0.367*** -0.394*** -0.403*** -0.304*** -0.335*** -0.426*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 75.326 260.827*** 199.345*** 320.588*** 89.284 122.682* 
 (0.354) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.195) (0.071) 
Loss Year -97.504*** -36.233 -66.759** -34.414 -67.105** -32.754 
 (0.002) (0.232) (0.026) (0.271) (0.013) (0.187) 
Zmijewski's Z-score -18.002*** -15.439*** -12.688*** -8.031*** -10.513*** -10.774*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-chair Duality 206.495*** 245.694*** -184.468 561.629*** 199.932* 9.921 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.550) (0.000) (0.059) (0.959) 
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8159 8544 8333 8476 8092 8031 
Adj R-squared 0.423 0.453 0.428 0.384 0.361 0.429 
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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